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THE SOCIAL BOUNDARIES 
OF CORPORATE TAXATION 
Sloan G. Speck* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States employs a classical system of corporate taxation in 
which income earned through certain domestic business entities—
“corporations” for tax purposes—is subject to taxation once at the entity 
level and again when distributed to the entity’s owners.  By contrast, 
income earned through other business entities—“conduits” for tax 
purposes—is taxable directly to the entity’s owners and not taxable at the 
entity level.1  The differential treatment of corporations and conduits places 
tremendous pressure on how corporations are defined under the Internal 
Revenue Code2 (“the Code”).  Not surprisingly, taxpayers and their 
advisors generally have taken an instrumental approach to the 
corporate/conduit distinction under the Code, seeking their preferred tax 
status while limiting adverse nontax consequences.3 
Historically, the tax law distinction between corporate and conduit 
treatment drew primarily on doctrinal understandings, treating state-law 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School.  Thanks to Lynn Stout 
and the other participants in the Fordham Law Review symposium entitled We Are What We 
Tax; participants in the University of Colorado Business Law Colloquium; and Ari 
Glogower, Kathryn Goldfarb, David Hasen, and Cathy Hwang for helpful comments.  For an 
overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, 
Foreword:  We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016). 
 
 1. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and 
Individual Income Taxes:  An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1767–68 (1999).  Not all 
corporate income faces two distinct levels of tax; for example, corporate income paid to tax-
exempt debtholders faces tax neither at the entity level nor when paid. Id. at 1768.  In 
addition, entity-level taxes may function as withholding or anti-deferral mechanisms with 
respect to shareholders, rather than distinct levies. See STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO 
SHIELD:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 83–84 
(2010) (describing the corporate tax between 1913 and World War I as “a complementary, 
rather than separate, tax”).  Finally, neither corporate nor conduit treatment is systematically 
favored, and taxpayers may prefer different classifications depending on their specific 
circumstances. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 2.01[2], Westlaw (database updated May 2015).  
These qualifications do not detract from—and perhaps increase—the pressure on 
distinguishing corporations and conduits. 
 2. The basic statutory definitions are contained in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1)–(3) (2012).  A 
significant body of law—statutory, administrative, and judicial—elaborates these categories. 
 3. See 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND 
PARTNERS ¶ 3.06[1], Westlaw (database updated May 2015). 
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corporations as corporate for tax purposes and classifying unincorporated 
legal entities based on their resemblance to conventional state-law 
corporations.  More recently, commentators and the U.S. Department of 
Treasury (“Treasury”) have abandoned these doctrinal touchstones in favor 
of efficiency, broadly construed, as the guiding principle in determining an 
entity’s tax classification.4  In part, this shift reflects conventional critiques 
of classical corporate taxation, which focus on the ways in which entity-
level taxes burden taxpayers’ choices, including the choice of entity under 
state corporate law, beyond the labor/leisure and saving/spending tradeoffs 
that underlie income taxation.  Alleviating the tax system’s pressure on 
these choices advances efficiency, the argument goes.5  More broadly, this 
shift in perspectives on corporate tax classification mirrors a larger turn in 
academic and policy circles, rooted in the 1970s, toward efficiency as a 
controlling metric for evaluating legal rules.6 
This Article argues that, while important, efficiency considerations 
should not function as the sole arbiter of the boundary between corporate 
and conduit tax treatment.  First, classical corporate taxation is, in many 
ways, deeply embedded within a larger network of legal and social 
meanings.7  Classical corporate taxation operates in concert with, rather 
than separately from, these legal and social meanings.  For this reason, the 
rules governing entities’ tax classification should take these 
interrelationships into account, if not as a primary norm, then as a 
secondary consideration when empirical or other uncertainties preclude a 
clear choice based on efficiency.8  The social boundaries of corporate 
taxation refer to the extent to which these types of nontax considerations 
implicate the Code’s structural distinction between corporations and 
conduits.9  Second, efficiency is often conceptually tractable as a metric, 
but this intuitive appeal can mask significant empirical uncertainties about 
 
 4. See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1627–28 (1999). 
 5. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 27–28 (2009).  In a 
world that recognizes legal entities, some of these efficiency costs may be unavoidable. See 
David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes:  Theory and 
Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215, 224–29 (2007). 
 6. See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory:  Do Misallocations 
Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 736–37 (1979). 
 7. The legal and social implications of taxation have long been acknowledged. See, 
e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 520 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014) (“[A] tax is always more than just a tax:  it is also a way of defining norms and 
categories and imposing a legal framework on economic activity.”). 
 8. More typical are claims that tax law should operate independently from other areas 
of law. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and 
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1251–52 (2008) (arguing that 
tax and corporate law should be severed with respect to entities’ country of residence). 
 9. Weisbach acknowledges that policymakers may consider “goals other than 
efficiency” in line drawing where the relevant law “attempts to change preferences.” See 
Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1676 & n.177 (giving as examples the restrictions on the 
deductibility of bribes and lobbying expenses, as well as the disparate tax consequences for 
married and unmarried couples).  Weisbach does not, however, contemplate that such other 
goals are relevant to structural aspects of the Code such as the corporate/conduit distinction. 
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behavioral responses, especially if policymakers possess limited 
information, have difficulty reversing inapposite decisions, or face other 
constraints.10  In these situations, policymakers should take cues from the 
broader legal and social context in which tax law operates.  Finally, by 
claiming that corporate tax law is situated in broader legal and social 
contexts, this Article does not attempt to validate or valorize the 
independent merit of these other contexts.  Instead, this Article advocates 
consistency across policy areas—“fit” within the broader legal and social 
framework—rather than particular policy prescriptions.11 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses the evolution of the 
basic rules governing corporate tax classification and the turn from doctrine 
to efficiency in the evaluation of these rules.  Part II brings historical 
understandings of corporations in the United States into conversation with 
current debates about corporate personhood and social responsibility.  Part 
III examines the boundaries of corporate tax classification through three 
vignettes that explore special tax categories that complicate the 
corporate/conduit distinction, namely small business corporations (“S 
corporations”), real estate investment trusts (REITs), and domestic 
corporations that have engaged in inversion transactions to shift their 
corporate residence to a non-U.S. jurisdiction. 
I.  EFFICIENCY AND CORPORATE TAX CLASSIFICATION 
The classification of legal entities for tax purposes presents a 
paradigmatic line-drawing problem, one intrinsic to the structural choice to 
impose a classical corporate tax.  Under the reasonable assumption that 
fundamental reform is impossible or unavailable to the policymakers 
charged with drafting the legal rule,12 the task is clear:  the rule must 
 
 10. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 746–48; see also Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes:  Can 
Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
859, 860–61 (2002) (outlining certain problems with applying “optimal commodity tax 
methodology” to income taxation); Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1666–71 (discussing 
informational and computational issues with determining the ex ante efficiency effects of 
line drawing). 
 11. See Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 
GEO. L.J. 889, 946–47 (2006) (describing corporate taxation as a “pragmatic compromise” 
that is not necessarily “the best or only means” to resolve the issue); cf. RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (arguing that interpretations of legal rules must both “fit” and “justify” 
a legitimate objective). 
 12. See David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes:  A Response to Professor 
Schlunk, 80 TEX. L. REV. 893, 895–97 (2002).  Congress generally has relied on Treasury 
and courts to give content to the statutory delineation between corporations and conduits. See 
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 1, ¶ 2.01[3]; see also Yehonatan Givati, Walking a Fine 
Line:  A Theory of Line Drawing in Tax Law, 34 VA. TAX REV. 469, 474–75 (2015) 
(describing how Treasury should choose among instruments for line drawing).  Fundamental 
reform to eliminate the corporate/conduit distinction would face significant political hurdles 
in Congress. See Heather M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box”, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
451, 521–22 (2009) (arguing that, in the late 1990s, administrative rulemaking may have 
alleviated any pressure Congress felt to enact more sweeping corporate tax reforms); see 
also Schlunk, supra note 10, at 861–62 (advocating fundamental reform as a solution to line-
drawing questions in the distinction between corporate debt and equity).  While Treasury and 
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categorize each relevant legal entity as either a corporation or a conduit for 
tax purposes.13  The collective pool of legal entities, however, is diverse 
and relatively continuous in its economic and legal characteristics.  These 
entities vary in, among other things, their ownership, management, capital 
structure, and the transferability of their interests; their name, the powers 
they possess under their charter and the law of the jurisdiction of their 
organization, and the activities they actually conduct; and any limitations on 
liability for owners or fiduciary duties imposed on managers.14  
Policymakers must denote certain of these characteristics as legally salient 
in order to parse these entities as either corporations or conduits for tax 
purposes. 
Changes in law, financial markets, and business practices have 
complicated, and likely will continue to complicate, the calculus for 
determining corporate classification under the Code.  For example, the 
advent of limited liability companies (LLCs) in the late 1970s, and their 
widespread adoption by the mid-1990s, gave businesses an alternative to 
state incorporation laws that preserved limited liability protections for all 
owners while allowing significant flexibility in governance and ownership 
structures.15  By the mid-2000s, this flexibility had been enhanced by a 
number of public and private legal innovations, including state statutes 
enabling “series” LLCs and automatic conversions among various entity 
types.16  Series LLCs allow a single legal entity to designate multiple series 
that are treated as separate and distinct from each other for liability 
purposes.17  State-law conversion statutes permit entities to change their 
type by filing a short certificate, enabling, for example, an LLC to convert 
to a corporation, or vice versa.18  Both of these innovations challenge 
conventional understandings of entities as having discrete, durable legal 
personhood, and in each of these cases, Treasury issued guidance that was 
relatively favorable to taxpayers by permitting LLCs to elect either 
corporate or conduit treatment,19 treating each series in a series LLC as a 
 
courts generally lack the power to engage in fundamental reform, the congressional political 
process also substantially limits the practical availability of such reform through the 
legislative process. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 40 NAT’L 
TAX J. 357 (1987) (describing the idiosyncratic politics that resulted in the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986).  Even at the congressional level, policymakers face line-drawing problems much 
more frequently than fundamental reform. 
 13. As discussed infra Part III.A and III.B, tax conduits are subject to several different 
tax regimes. 
 14. See, e.g., BANK, supra note 1, at xi; LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE 
UNCORPORATION 67–75 (2010). 
 15. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 119–23. 
 16. See id. at 146–47. 
 17. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(a)–(b) (2016).  The extent to which liabilities 
are “siloed” has not been tested extensively at state law. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 
146–47. 
 18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-214(a)–(b) (allowing conversions to Delaware 
LLCs). 
 19. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 
1980).  For more detail, see Field, supra note 12, at 460–63. 
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separate entity for tax purposes,20 and allowing state-law conversions to 
qualify for tax-free treatment under conventional tax rules.21  Finally, 
globalization has increased dramatically the number and variety of entities 
whose tax classifications are relevant for U.S. tax purposes; domestic and 
foreign multinationals may own subsidiary entities both inside and outside 
the United States.22  Again, this change amplifies the number of variables in 
play when drawing lines between corporations and conduits in the tax 
system. 
Before 1997, Treasury employed an approach to line drawing that looked 
to doctrinal distinctions drawn from state corporate law.  For entities 
incorporated under state law, this fact was dispositive; such entities were 
treated as corporations for tax purposes.23  In addition, after 1986, most 
entities listed on a public stock exchange were taxable as corporations.24  
By contrast, Treasury regulations classified unincorporated entities based 
on their resemblance to a “pure corporation,” as measured by six “major 
characteristics.”  Drawn from Morrissey v. Commissioner,25 these 
characteristics included the existence of “associates” (roughly, joint 
owners), the presence of an entity-level business objective, continuity of 
life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free transferability 
of ownership interests.26  Because all business entities had associates and an 
entity-level business objective, the regulations deemed an unincorporated 
entity a corporation for tax purposes if it possessed at least three of the 
remaining four characteristics.27 
Ultimately, Treasury’s doctrinal approach to line drawing failed to 
delineate corporations from conduits in a meaningful way.  Sophisticated 
taxpayers, in consultation with their advisors and in reliance on legal 
opinions, could manipulate the Morrissey factors to achieve their preferred 
tax classification with limited changes to the underlying economic 
 
 20. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-03-004 (Jan. 18, 2008). 
 21. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
2005-48-021 (Dec. 2, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-28-021 (July 15, 2005).  
Furthermore, these changes occurred alongside an expansion in the use of other conduits, 
such as S corporations. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See BANK, supra note 1, at 261–64.  In addition, that entities can be relevant in more 
than one jurisdiction creates difficult-to-police arbitrage opportunities. See generally Gregg 
D. Lemein & John D. McDonald, Final Code Sec. 894 Regulations:  Treaty Benefits for 
Hybrid Entity Payments, TAXES, Sept. 2000, at 5, 5–6 (hybrid entities); Gregg D. Lemein & 
John D. McDonald, Proposed Regulations Regarding Domestic Reverse Hybrid Entities, 
TAXES, May 2001, at 5, 7–8 (reverse hybrid entities). 
 23. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 1, ¶ 2.02[1] (discussing Morrissey v. 
Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)). 
 24. See I.R.C. § 7704 (2012). 
 25. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). 
 26. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960) (revised 1997).  The regulations were issued 
in 1960 in response to the Internal Revenue Service’s loss in United States v. Kintner, 216 
F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), and typically are referred to as the “Kintner regulations.” 
 27. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2)–(3) (1960). 
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arrangement.28  By the mid-1990s, Treasury acknowledged that the 
regulations’ “formalistic rules” allowed taxpayers to “achieve partnership 
[that is, conduit] tax classification for a nonpublicly traded organization 
that, in all meaningful respects, [was] virtually indistinguishable from a 
[state-law] corporation.”29  For unincorporated entities, the choice between 
corporate taxation and conduit taxation had become “effectively elective.”30 
In late 1996, Treasury promulgated the “check-the-box” regulations, 
which replaced the effectively elective Morrissey factors with a regime that 
was explicitly elective with respect to unincorporated entities whose 
interests were not readily tradable (so-called “eligible entities”).31  By 
contrast, state-law corporations and similar enumerated entities (“per se 
corporations”), as well as most publicly traded entities, could not choose to 
be taxable as conduits.32  In addition, the check-the-box regulations 
included complex default rules that Treasury claimed “generally would 
match taxpayers’ expectations.”33  The check-the-box regulations were well 
received by taxpayers and their advisors, and Treasury trumpeted its 
approach as “much simpler” to implement by both public and private 
actors.34 
Subsequent commentators have addressed the effectiveness of the check-
the-box regulations by focusing on efficiency considerations, broadly 
construed.35  For this Article, the core efficiency consideration is 
deadweight loss, which describes the costs associated with private actors’ 
behavioral changes in response to a tax.  These behavioral changes include 
the substitution of less-taxed activities for more-taxed (but otherwise 
preferred) activities, as well as the private costs of tax avoidance and 
evasion—that is, the costs to engage in preferred (but otherwise taxed) 
activities without paying the applicable tax.36  Efficiency considerations 
also include public administrative costs, private compliance costs with 
regard to reporting, and simplicity (which presumably lowers both public 
 
 28. See I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297 (noting that, under the pre-1997 regime, 
“small unincorporated organizations may not have sufficient resources and expertise to apply 
the current classification regulations to achieve the tax classification they desire”). 
 29. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,990 (May 13, 1996). 
 30. See SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 27–28, 52–54. 
 31. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006). 
 32. See I.R.C. § 7704 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2014). 
 33. T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215, 218. 
 34. Id. at 216; see also I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297. 
 35. See Joel Slemrod & Schlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, 
in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1447 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein 
eds., 2002) (adopting “a broader concept of efficiency cost”). 
 36. One could exclude transfers among private actors, such as payments to lawyers and 
accountants, from the category of deadweight loss because such transfers do not involve real 
resource costs. See Raj Chetty, Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate 
Deadweight Loss?:  The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance, 1 AM. ECON. J.:  ECON. 
POL’Y 31, 32 (2009). 
2016] SOCIAL BOUNDARIES OF CORPORATE TAXATION 2589 
and private administrative costs).37  The common thread in these efficiency 
considerations is that they constitute the aggregate social cost of taxation. 
Shortly after Treasury finalized the check-the-box regulations, David 
Weisbach argued in favor of the type of reform that these regulations 
represented.  By “drop[ping] traditional doctrinal concerns and instead 
focus[ing] on efficiency,” bad taxes could be replaced with better ones, and 
any revenue loss or distributional effects could be remediated through 
changes to the rate structure or transfer system.38  Treasury could maximize 
efficiency by drawing the line between corporations and pass-through 
entities to treat close economic substitutes the same while keeping tax rates 
low for items with ready substitutes.39  In Weisbach’s analysis, the check-
the-box regulations accomplished this by classifying publicly traded entities 
as corporations for tax purposes and allowing all other entities to migrate to 
a pass-through regime.40  Although this statement is largely true, taxpayers 
use entities classified as corporations for tax purposes in a variety of well-
established situations outside of public markets, including in certain small 
business arrangements and as leveraged blockers for investments in U.S. 
real property by non-U.S. persons.41  In addition, the category of publicly 
traded entities requires regulators to draw a second line, with the 
consequence that some entities with highly liquid interests will fall outside 
the corporate tax base and into the elective regime.42  For these reasons, the 
line drawn by the check-the-box regulations is not entirely coextensive with 
the efficient line Weisbach postulated. 
Although subsequent commentators have taken a less-rosy view of the 
check-the-box regulations, their critiques also focus on efficiency 
considerations.  Steven Dean, for example, argues that the simplicity-related 
 
 37. See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal 
Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 172, 173, 179–82 (1996) (including all of 
these social costs when calculating the marginal efficiency cost of funds).  For more on 
social costs and efficiency considerations, see Leigh Osofsky, Who’s Naughty and Who’s 
Nice?:  Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1063 nn.15–16 
(2013). 
 38. Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1628–31 (“[W]hat is important about the check-the-box 
regulations is that they drop traditional doctrinal concerns and instead focus on efficiency.”).  
Weisbach also raises “traditional tax policy concerns,” such as conformity to the Haig-
Simons definition of economic income, as a possible (but flawed) basis for distinguishing 
corporate and noncorporate entities for tax purposes. Id. 
 39. See id. at 1663–64 (discussing “substitution costs” and “direct costs” and applying 
both concepts to entity classification). 
 40. Id. at 1628–31; see also David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing 
in the Tax Law, 29 J. LEGAL. STUD. 71, 71–73 (2000). 
 41. See COOLEY LLP & PROBITAS PARTNERS, U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA:  
STRUCTURES TO MAXIMIZE NET RETURNS TO NON-U.S. INVESTORS 3–4, 5–7 (2014), https:// 
www.cooley.com/files/probitas_partners_cooley_FIRPTA_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/5UZE-
MXVN]; Barbara Weltman, 5 Reasons to Be a C Corporation, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 
(May 23, 2012), https://www.sba.gov/blogs/5-reasons-be-c-corporation [http://perma.cc/ 
2CVX-W9PU]. 
 42. See Lee A. Sheppard, What Is Public Trading?, 67 TAX NOTES 443, 443 (1995) 
(describing the definition of “publicly traded” as “a new front in the entity classification 
wars”). 
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benefits promised by Treasury in the 1990s never materialized.  Instead, the 
check-the-box regulations “deliver[ed] pro-taxpayer deregulation that 
[caused] more of society’s resources to be devoted to paying, minimizing, 
and collecting taxes”—all social costs that implicate efficiency 
considerations.43  Similarly, Heather Field argues that, although the check-
the-box regulations simplified the law in some respects, eased certain 
administrative and compliance burdens, and promoted neutrality with 
respect to choice-of-entity considerations, the regulations also introduced 
new areas of complexity and transaction costs.44  Significantly, the check-
the-box regulations facilitated increased planning and avoidance efforts by 
taxpayers, often to achieve tax effects not related directly to the 
corporate/conduit distinction.45  Field concludes that the check-the-box 
regulations “represent an improvement over the [prior] regulations” but “are 
far from a panacea.”46  The common thread for Weisbach, Dean, and Field 
is that efficiency considerations drive the analysis and evaluation of entity 
classification schemes under the Code. 
II.  THEORIZING CORPORATIONS 
In evaluating the rules for classifying entities for tax purposes, an 
orientation toward efficiency considerations obscures the broader legal and 
social implications of the choice of whether to subject a business entity to 
corporate taxation.  Such an orientation treats the tax system as separate 
from other legal regimes governing entities’ existence and activities, such 
as state corporate law, and as distinct from broader understandings about 
the role of business in society.  This part first develops connections between 
tax and nontax understandings of corporations, then addresses two potential 
objections to deploying these understandings in tax policy. 
A.  Corporate Identity 
Corporate law scholars have identified three principal theories of 
corporate identity, which over time have exchanged positions of 
prominence in academic, legal, and popular understandings of 
corporations.47  First, the “artificial entity” theory holds that corporations, 
 
 43. See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity:  Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box 
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 466–67 (2005) 
[hereinafter Dean, Attractive Complexity]; see also Steven A. Dean, Tax Deregulation, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 390 (2011). 
 44. See Field, supra note 12, at 471–78, 490. 
 45. See id. at 486–87. 
 46. See id. at 522.  One way of reading Field’s argument is that the check-the-box 
regulations radically democratized the entity classification process, removing certain aspects 
of tax planning from social norms that previously constrained abuses. See generally TANINA 
ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES:  LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE 
TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY (2014). 
 47. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate 
Form:  A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
767, 772–813 (2005); Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups:  Corporate 
Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 891–97 (2012); Martin Petrin, 
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as creatures of the state, are subject to unlimited regulation by the state, 
including through taxation.  Second, the “aggregate” theory views 
corporations as agglomerations of their owners or other stakeholders.  In the 
1970s, the law and economics movement drew on the aggregate theory to 
describe the corporation as a “nexus of contracts” that coordinates 
production using many independent actors.  Similarly, the “lock-in” theory 
of corporate identity, developed in the 2000s, contends that corporations’ 
distinguishing feature is their ability to credibly commit their owners’ 
capital to long-term investments without claim by those owners.48  Finally, 
the “real entity” theory treats corporations as distinct legal persons with 
specific rights and obligations not linked to those of their owners.  Although 
each of these theories explains some aspects of corporate law, the aggregate 
and real entity theories have the most legal and social salience today.49 
To some extent, these theories of corporate identity simply fail to map 
onto tax scholarship, and tax scholars often argue that these theories 
provide limited normative justification for the corporate tax.  For example, 
Reuven Avi-Yonah claims that none of the artificial entity, aggregate, or 
real entity theories provides a clean justification for the corporate tax.50  
More generally, tax scholars describe popular understandings that 
corporations or other business entities bear the burden of, or ultimately pay, 
the corporate tax as a “fiscal illusion.”51  Instead, natural persons bear the 
burden of corporate taxes, and although some consensus exists that labor 
and holders of capital share this burden at equilibrium, the precise 
proportions of this allocation engender significant disagreement.52  For tax 
scholars, corporations resemble neither “real” entities nor aggregates of 
their direct constituents, and the true measure of the corporate tax (and 
nearly all tax scholars take a dim view) requires understanding both its 
incidence and efficiency costs.53  Corporate law and tax scholars diverge 
 
Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
1, 10–13, 33–42 (2013). 
 48. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 254–
55; see also Bank, supra note 11, at 892. 
 49. See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1061–63 (1994). 
 50. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State:  A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1197–212 (2004); see also Jennifer Arlen & Deborah 
M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 331–32 (1995) 
(discussing “populist” explanations of the durability of corporate taxation in the United 
States). 
 51. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 50, at 1208–11. 
 52. See SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 61–62, 67–70 (discussing the “New Harberger” 
model).  Economists have done general equilibrium modeling and empirical work on 
corporate tax incidence, and estimates of incidence vary significantly under both approaches. 
See WILLIAM M. GENTRY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS PAPER 101, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 4–6 (2007), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/ota101.pdf (analyzing the empirical data) 
[http://perma.cc/UKB7-DNQQ]; Jennifer Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence:  Review of 
General Equilibrium Estimates and Analysis, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 185, 204–05, 211 (2013). 
 53. See Bank, supra note 11, at 896–97. 
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fundamentally in how they debate the role of legal entities, and especially 
corporations, in their respective fields. 
The artificial entity, aggregate, and real entity theories of corporate 
identity matter, however, in the sense that they have positive, and 
potentially normative, value in state corporate and entity law.  In turn, this 
state law has significant historical linkages to the design of the corporate 
tax.  For example, Steven Bank argues that, in the early twentieth century, 
the managers of state-law corporations accepted entity-level taxation as a 
price to maintain corporations’ ability to retain earnings and credibly 
commit capital, consistent with the lock-in theory of corporate identity.54  
Although Bank acknowledges the (efficiency) costs of such a compromise 
(and is agnostic about the (efficiency) value of lock-in for corporate law 
purposes), his analysis illustrates that choices about the scope of corporate 
taxation can interact, positively or negatively, with core principles in 
corporate law.55  These interactions indicate that an approach to entity 
classification based exclusively on line drawing and efficiency 
considerations may fail to account for the broader legal context in which 
corporate taxation operates. 
B.  Corporate Personhood and Social Responsibility 
Not only is corporate taxation enmeshed with state laws governing 
corporations and other entities, but it also is situated within broader social 
understandings of corporate personhood, rights, and responsibilities.  In the 
tax academic literature, these social understandings suffer because they tend 
to be diffuse, perhaps intrinsically so, and often stand at odds with a 
rational, economically informed perspective on public policy.56  The recent 
renaissance in judicial, academic, and popular engagement with the nature 
of corporate personality indicates, however, that these social understandings 
should not be dismissed as irrelevant to tax law and policy.57 
At the heart of this recent renaissance lie two well-known Supreme Court 
decisions—Citizens United v. FEC58 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
 
 54. See id. at 917–31; see also Arlen & Weiss, supra note 50, at 348–62 (discussing the 
“retained earnings trap”). 
 55. See Bank, supra note 11, at 947. 
 56. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest:  A Study of the 
Legislative Process As Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57–
61 (1990) (arguing that, in terms of public opinion, “[r]ational ignorance is mixed with just 
plain ignorance”). 
 57. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens 
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337, 337 (2011) (“Few campaign finance cases have drawn more 
public attention than [Citizens United].”); Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 154, 154–57 (2014) (describing public opinions about Hobby Lobby as 
“divided” and “inflamed”); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the 
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 863 (2013) (“Much 
of the public backlash against Citizens United can be seen as a populist rejection of the idea 
that corporations are merely associations of citizens.”). 
 58. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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Inc.59—both of which implicate policy choices about which types of entities 
should be subject to corporate taxation.  Citizens United invalidated 
portions of the McCain-Feingold Act, as well as certain state laws, that 
restricted corporate spending on “electioneering communications” in 
advance of elections.60  Citizens United, a not-for-profit state-law 
corporation, paid for advertising and distribution of a film criticizing 
Hillary Clinton, who was running for the Democratic presidential 
nomination in 2008.61  The Court held that, while such spending violated 
the McCain-Feingold Act, the Act itself contravened Citizens United’s First 
Amendment rights to free speech.62 
Although Citizens United’s tax-exempt status did not figure prominently 
into the Court’s opinion, taxation proved critical to the decision’s 
subsequent effects.63  Citizens United was exempt from tax under section 
501(c)(4) of the Code,64 one of several provisions under section 501(c) that 
exempt entities from corporate taxation based on their organization and 
purposes.65  In the wake of Citizens United, contributions to section 
501(c)(4)-qualified groups increased dramatically.66  The decision had the 
effect of linking tax status to a mode of political expression, both under the 
law and in the popular imagination.  In addition, an internal Treasury 
review confirmed congressional suspicions that, after Citizens United, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had applied additional scrutiny to certain 
conservative groups, among others, applying for tax-exempt status under 
section 501(c)(4).67  Following these revelations, some viewed the tax 
system as a partisan mechanism for contesting the Court’s extension of First 
Amendment rights to state-law corporations.68  In these ways, Citizens 
 
 59. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 60. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 passim.  Justice Kennedy wrote for a divided Court. 
 61. Id. at 319–20, 404–05. 
 62. Id. at 371–72. 
 63. Theories of corporate identity, however, played a role in the opinions, although 
scholars debate the nature of that role. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the 
Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1033; Alan Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby 
Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm:  Why For-Profit Corporations Are 
RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 280–81 (2014); Padfield, supra note 57, at 843–
48; David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law:  Corporate Social 
Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1217–18 (2011).  For a brief 
overview of historical understandings of corporate rights and identity, see Naomi Lamoreaux 
& William Novak, Getting the History Right:  Tracking the Real History of Corporate 
Rights in American Constitutional Thought, SLATE (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/hobby_lobby_and_corporate_personhood_
here_s_the_real_history_of_corporate.html [http://perma.cc/9NVV-R2CW]. 
 64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 404. 
 65. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012). 
 66. See Briffault, supra note 57, at 337–38. 
 67. See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED 
TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW 5–6 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf [http://perma.cc/P3WE-RQ4S]. 
 68. For an overview of these events, see Frances R. Hill, Citizens United and Social 
Welfare Organizations:  The Tangled Relationships Among Guidance, Compliance, and 
Enforcement, 43 STETSON L. REV. 539, 539–42 (2014). 
2594 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
United highlights how tax law interplays with nontax questions about the 
social role of corporate actors. 
The Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby also had significant connections to 
taxation.  At stake were certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act of 
2010 that required employers either to provide health care coverage to 
employees that included costless access to contraceptives or to pay a 
nondeductible “penalty” administered through the Code.69  The two 
employers before the Court were corporations, each substantially owned by 
a single family who objected, based on religious beliefs, to providing access 
to contraceptives.70  Both employers also qualified as S corporations under 
the Code, a conduit tax status available to certain closely held 
corporations.71  Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held for these 
employers, finding that the contraceptive mandate violated the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.  Material to Justice Alito’s opinion was 
the fact that the actions of these employers substantially aligned with the 
beliefs of their owners.72  Indeed, this alignment of interests extends to 
taxation, where the nondeductible penalty directly affected these owners’ 
tax liabilities.73  Like Citizens United, Hobby Lobby illustrates how tax and 
substantive corporate powers are intertwined. 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby address the rights of corporations; the 
obverse of these holdings involves understandings of corporations’ social 
responsibilities.  After (and notwithstanding) Milton Friedman’s famous 
admonition that corporate managers have no duty other than to generate 
profits for their shareholders,74 ideas of corporate social responsibility have 
become prominent in business, academic, and popular discourses.75  Indeed, 
in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito noted that “modern corporate law does not 
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything 
else, and many do not do so.”76  Writing in the wake of the social 
movements of the 1950s and 1960s, Friedman explicitly juxtaposed 
managerial spending on social causes with taxation, arguing that such 
 
 69. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014). 
 70. Id. at 2763–67. 
 71. See I.R.C. §§ 1363(a), 1366(a) (2012). 
 72. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774–75, 2785.  For more discussion, see Brandon L. 
Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 145–46 (2014). 
 73. See, e.g., Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion:  The Hobby Lobby 
and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 72–73 (2013). 
 74. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase 
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
 75. Although the relationship between business and society has changed over time, the 
postwar period ushered a new focus on the responsibilities of business to other stakeholders. 
See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. FONES-WOLF, SELLING FREE ENTERPRISE:  THE BUSINESS ASSAULT 
ON LABOR AND LIBERALISM, 1945–60, at 5 (1994) (“[C]orporate leaders constructed and sold 
a specific vision of the reciprocal relationship of businesses and citizens that stressed mutual 
rights and responsibilities.”).  Friedman wrote in the context of this new focus. 
 76. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.  For a discussion of how theories of corporate 
identity inform debates about corporate social responsibility, see Petrin, supra note 47, at 
22–26; Michael J. Philips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the 
Corporation, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 435, 435–36 (1992). 
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managers usurp the role of government by “in effect imposing taxes, on the 
one hand, and deciding how the tax proceeds shall be spent, on the other.”77  
Justice Stevens mobilized similar concepts in his minority opinion in 
Citizens United, writing that corporate political speech “can impose a kind 
of implicit tax” on shareholders by “effectively forc[ing] corporations to use 
their shareholders’ money both to maintain access to, and to avoid 
retribution from, elected officials.”78  Under this view, certain manager-
driven corporate actions replicate the spending and taxing functions of 
representative government. 
If these types of corporate actions substitute for democratic decision 
making on social issues, a corollary question is how such actions affect 
corporations’ then-existing fiscal obligations to the state.  As Mihir Desai 
writes, 
[I]ronically, managers have come to embrace corporate social 
responsibility.  Companies routinely tout their constructive role in society 
and pour resources into social programs even as they pursue aggressive 
tax strategies.  Instead they should show their commitment to their 
communities by treating their tax obligations as a responsibility 
commensurate with, say, abiding by environmental regulations.79 
Although corporations may have adopted corporate social responsibility 
rhetoric and activities to advance their business interests rather than 
pursuant to an altruistic motive, social understandings about corporations’ 
responsibilities to the state and the polity are necessarily linked to questions 
about which entities should, or should not, be subject to corporate-level tax. 
C.  Two Objections 
This section addresses two potential objections to using nontax legal or 
social understandings in setting rules that determine the scope of the 
corporate tax base, such as the check-the-box regulations.  First, these 
nontax legal or social understandings may introduce tax-expenditure 
features into the Code, in that these understandings may justify deviations 
from a normative or ideal corporate income tax base, taking the existence of 
such a tax as a given.80  To the extent that tax expenditures obscure or 
entrench social policy in ways that do not align with the polity’s 
preferences, these types of deviations imply a breakdown in political 
 
 77. Friedman, supra note 74, at 33, 122.  Friedman also believed that government’s role 
in society should be relatively limited. See id. 
 78. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 468 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 79. Mihir A. Desai, A Better Way to Tax U.S. Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 
2012, at 134, 139. 
 80. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives As a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy:  A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 705–
06 (1970). 
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economy and should be resisted.81  Resolving this objection, however, 
would require the tax system to operate independently of corporate law and 
social understandings about corporations, and implementing this degree of 
separation would require fundamental reform, an option generally assumed 
to be unavailable in the line-drawing literature.82  For example, 
policymakers would need to abandon the longstanding norm that state-law 
corporations are classified as corporations for tax purposes.83  To the extent 
that corporate law and social understandings are embedded in the structural 
distinction in tax law between corporations and conduits, these nontax legal 
and social understandings should inform the construction of the corporate 
tax base. 
A second objection is that these nontax legal and social understandings 
are simply misguided, and as such, policymakers should ignore them.  For 
example, theories of corporate identity, such as the real entity theory, may 
be unjustifiable, and adhering to these flawed theories when defining the 
corporate tax base may perpetuate the fiscal illusion that corporate entities, 
rather than human beings, bear the burden of taxation.84  In this case, 
aligning tax law with inapposite corporate-law values could have 
deleterious effects by essentially compounding one mistake in corporate 
law with a second error in taxation.  For social understandings, individuals’ 
subjective beliefs about the tax system also may be wrong.85  Although 
individuals may not comply with a tax system that either fails to meet their 
expectations or appears unfair to them, it is not clear that policymakers 
should defer to these incorrect beliefs when making decisions, rather than 
simply enacting the objectively best policy.86  These types of incongruities, 
however, can indicate places where tax law is misaligned with other areas 
of law or social norms and may signal opportunities for incremental 
improvements in outcomes, assuming that fundamental reform is 
unavailable.  In addition, social understandings may offer a way to resolve 
policy questions in situations where economic factors, such as incidence or 
net efficiency consequences, are uncertain or unclear.  Finally, democratic 
 
 81. See id. at 722, 731–32.  For a critical analysis of this perspective, see Boris I. Bittker, 
A “Comprehensive Tax Base” As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 
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 84. See supra Part II.A. 
 85. See supra Part II.A. 
 86. See Dean, Attractive Complexity, supra note 43, at 418 (discussing “the confidence 
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values or other primary norms may support relying on such social 
understandings, even if they are misguided. 
III.  THREE VIGNETTES 
The contours of corporate taxation have implications beyond current 
debates about corporate personhood.  This part presents three vignettes of 
specific features of corporate tax law that engage normative questions about 
which business operations should be subject to corporate tax.  In each of 
these vignettes, an efficiency-type analysis, where close substitutes are 
taxed the same, produces ambiguous or potentially undesirable results.  All 
three vignettes implicate questions of which entities should be included in 
the corporate tax base—that is, they engage the Code’s entity classification 
system beyond the boundaries of the check-the-box regulations and the 
scholarship on those regulations.  These vignettes are intended to challenge 
the primacy of efficiency in setting entity classification rules for tax 
purposes and to illustrate the relevance of nontax legal considerations and 
social understandings in resolving these rules. 
A.  Small Businesses and S Corporations 
In 1958, Congress enacted subchapter S of the Code, which permits 
certain closely held state-law corporations to elect out of federal corporate 
taxation and into a conduit regime.87  The stated purpose of subchapter S 
was to “permit[] businesses to select the form of business organization 
desired, without the necessity of taking into account major differences in 
tax consequence.”88  Originally intended to complement rules that 
permitted sole proprietorships to be taxed as corporations, only the election 
out of the corporate tax base survived the Technical Amendments Act of 
1958.89  An election under subchapter S favored individuals who owned 
closely held corporations (at the time, limited to ten shareholders) and who, 
for example, faced marginal tax rates close to or below the corporate tax 
rate (generally, not the highest earners).90 
Although the S corporation rules ostensibly decoupled corporate law 
considerations from tax effects, the S corporation regime arguably 
functioned less to ameliorate choice-of-entity distortions and more to 
 
 87. The S corporation conduit regime is not the same as the partnership conduit regime. 
See I.R.C. §§ 1361–1379 (2012). 
 88. See S. REP. NO. 85-1983, at 87 (1958). 
 89. In 1954, the Senate passed rules similar to subchapter S, which the House rejected. 
See id. (discussing a proposed subchapter R).  Congress did pass the complementary 
provision that allowed elections into the corporate tax base, apparently to provide specific 
relief to a small number of taxpayers who desired the provision.  This second provision was 
repealed in 1958. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot:  
Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX. REV. 1, 
33 n.211 (2008). 
 90. See S. REP. NO. 85-1983, at 87 (citing a corporate rate of 52 percent).  At the time, 
individual rates ranged from 20 to 91 percent. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 89, at 10. 
2598 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
subsidize small businesses.91  In the 1950s, clear corporate and 
noncorporate sectors existed.  Agriculture, real estate, and miscellaneous 
repair services operated through state-law partnerships, while all other 
industries almost uniformly employed state-law corporations to do 
business.92  Under these facts, choice-of-entity considerations were 
substantially inelastic with respect to tax rates, and corporate taxation had 
limited effect on whether particular businesses organized as state-law 
corporations or partnerships.93  Furthermore, Congress enacted subchapter 
S in the context of broader federal efforts to aid small businesses in 
acquiring financing and competing with larger concerns.94  From this 
perspective, subchapter S initially operated as a targeted subsidy to certain 
small businesses owned by certain middle-income individuals.  In effect, 
subchapter S permitted an elective rate reduction for these small businesses 
that purportedly would reduce the number of small business failures and 
increase the tax system’s overall progressivity.95 
In 1982, Congress overhauled the S corporation provisions.96  This 
overhaul relaxed the eligibility requirements for S corporation status and 
aligned the S corporation conduit regime more closely with the partnership 
conduit rules under subchapter K.97  The effect was significant:  the number 
of S corporation returns filed increased eightfold between 1982 and 2012, 
and the share of corporate tax returns that belonged to S corporations 
increased from 20 percent to more than 70 percent.98  This period also 
spanned the height of effective electivity for entity classification, as well as 
the advent of the check-the-box rules.99  After 1982, the S corporation rules 
 
 91. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 89, at 3. 
 92. See Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. 
ECON. 215, 216–17, 230–31 (1962) (noting, however, “a fringe of unincorporated 
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WASH. & LEE L. REV. 433, 441–42 (1983). 
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Congress?, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4–5 (2011) (discussing the Small Business Investment 
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 95. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 89, at 52–53. 
 96. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (codified as 
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 97. See SAMUEL P. STARR ET AL., S CORPORATIONS:  FORMATION AND TERMINATION, pt. 
I.B.2, BNA (Tax Management Portfolio 730-3d, database updated 2016). 
 98. Although the share of corporate gross receipts earned by S corporations also 
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attributable to C corporations (22 percent compared to 76 percent). See SOI Tax Stats—
Integrated Business Data, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Integrated-Business-
Data (last updated Apr. 15, 2015) (providing selected financial data on businesses from 1980 
to 2012 in Table 1) [http://perma.cc/C9RQ-6UJP]. 
 99. See supra Part I. 
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functioned less as a targeted subsidy and more as part of a larger trend that 
favored decoupling state-law entities and their tax classifications. 
This history complicates understandings of the S corporation rules under 
a line-drawing analysis.  If partnerships and closely held corporations are 
close substitutes, then homogenizing their tax treatment makes sense from 
an efficiency perspective.  This rationale, however, is inconsistent with the 
subsidy function of the original S corporation rules, which attempted to 
lower average rates on small businesses and supported increased 
progressivity.  In addition, the administrative costs and arbitrage 
opportunities inherent in maintaining parallel conduit regimes undercut a 
line-drawing analysis based on efficiency considerations.100  Underlying 
social understandings about the value of small businesses, whether correct 
or misguided, may tip the balance in favor of maintaining a dual regime. 
B.  Real Estate Ownership and REITs 
A second vignette, which again challenges a strict efficiency approach to 
the corporate/conduit divide, analyzes the rules governing REITs.  The 
REIT rules allow state-law entities with passive real estate activities and 
diffuse ownership to elect into a special conduit regime.101  Congress 
enacted the REIT provisions in 1960, at a time when owners typically 
formed state-law limited partnerships to conduct real estate activities.102  
Generally, only wealthy or well-connected investors could access these real 
estate partnerships.103  In creating the REIT regime, Congress addressed 
several concerns, including the lack of parity between large investors and 
small investors with respect to real estate, the disparate tax treatment of 
regulated investments companies (RICs) such as mutual funds compared to 
similar vehicles for real estate, and the availability of capital to the real 
estate sector.104  At the same time, policymakers worked to preserve 
classical corporate taxation for so-called “active” businesses, even if those 
businesses involved significant real estate.105 
Since Congress created REITs as an exception to corporate tax treatment, 
REITs have grown significantly in scope and importance within the 
financial system, a change fueled by legislative and administrative actions 
 
 100. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY 
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 101. See I.R.C. §§ 856–860 (2012); see also Bradley T. Borden, Reforming REIT 
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 103. See PETER M. FASS ET AL., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK:  A PASS-
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(database updated 2015). 
 104. See Borden, supra note 101, at 13–21. 
 105. See id. at 19–20, 60. 
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as well as market-driven legal innovations.106  Justifications for (or 
rationalizations of) these changes generally have looked to the original 
purposes of the REIT regime.  For example, commentators defend the rules 
relaxing the types of services that REITs could provide (that is, how 
“active” they could be) because the new rules “appropriately made REITs 
more similar to limited partnerships.”107  In addition, less restrictive rules to 
facilitate REIT ownership by pension plans have been characterized as 
consistent with efforts to democratize and encourage investment in real 
estate.108  From this perspective, expansions of the REIT regime advance 
the social goals of the original legislation. 
Critics of these changes argue that expanded REIT rules vitiate the 
corporate tax base by allowing largely active businesses to divert earnings 
to the REIT conduit regime.109  Recent concerns have crystalized around 
two issues:  the definition of “real property” for REIT purposes and tax-free 
spin-offs involving an existing active business and a newly formed REIT.  
Starting in the late 1960s, the IRS issued a series of increasingly permissive 
rulings that allowed REITs to apply nontraditional real estate assets—from 
railroad tracks to mobile homes to certain on-site energy generation 
systems—toward certain REIT qualification requirements.  This practice 
accelerated in the 2000s, as the IRS issued rulings that gave favorable 
treatment under the REIT rules to distribution systems and pipelines, 
communication towers, data centers, and billboards; simultaneously, critics 
lamented these rulings’ effects on the corporate tax base.110  Similarly, 
critics have highlighted the negative effects on the corporate tax base of tax-
free spin-offs in which one of the resulting companies elects REIT status 
and leases its real estate assets back to the other resulting company.111  
These spin-offs effectively permit integrated operating companies to 
separate their real estate assets into a tax-advantaged vehicle.  Congress 
essentially foreclosed these types of spinoffs by legislation in December 
2015.112 
An efficiency analysis does little to clarify debates over the REIT 
regime’s expansion.  REITs can be publicly traded or privately held.113  
Under an approach analogous to the current check-the-box regulations, 
public trading represents a possible line by which to classify REITs as 
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 110. See Boos, supra note 106, at 1294–98; Borden, supra note 101, at 52–53. 
 111. See Borden, supra note 101, at 52. 
 112. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, CONGRESS ENACTS SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE 
REIT AND FIRPTA RULES 1 (2015), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-congress-
reit-firpta-rules [http://perma.cc/B4QV-2CH8]. 
 113. See FASS ET AL., supra note 103, § 1:81 (describing various ways to satisfy the REIT 
ownership tests). 
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corporations or conduits.  Also relevant to the REIT rules, however, are two 
other close substitutes:  real estate partnerships, which are conventional 
vehicles for investment in real estate, and RICs, which facilitate passive, 
diversified investments by small holders of capital.  Indeed, the tensions 
between these two substitutes better explain current debates about the REIT 
regime’s scope, which generally focus on parity between REITs and either 
real estate partnerships or RICs.114  The choice between these two 
substitutes—and corporate or conduit taxation—depends on the social goals 
at stake.  In this way, a broader look at the social understandings and 
critiques of REITs, rather than a pure efficiency analysis, may help inform 
the appropriate framework for REIT taxation. 
C.  Corporate Residence and Inversions 
The final vignette explores line drawing in the taxation of international 
business activities through the lens of corporate residence and inversions.  
The United States, which taxes domestic corporations on their worldwide 
income, defines corporate residence as the jurisdiction where a corporation 
is “created or organized.”115  By contrast, many non-U.S. legal systems 
impose tax on resident corporations only with respect to their business 
income arising in that jurisdiction (known as “territorial” taxation), with 
residence determined under a multifactor test that examines, for example, a 
corporation’s management or operations.116  Together, these disparate tax 
rules produce an incentive for corporations incorporated in the United 
States to migrate to or be acquired by an entity organized in a non-U.S. 
jurisdiction—a type of transaction known colloquially as a corporate 
expatriation or corporate inversion.117 
A central benefit of inversions is that they enable U.S.-incorporated 
multinationals to achieve a sort of “self-help” territorial taxation, in which 
the expatriating entity faces U.S. tax only on income from its U.S. 
operations.118  Multinationals can amplify this effect through “earnings 
 
 114. See Borden, supra note 101, at 62–67 (describing this issue as an “inequity 
conundrum”). 
 115. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 7701(a)(4) (2012).  The United States credits certain foreign 
income taxes paid against corporations’ domestic tax liabilities. See id. §§ 901, 902. 
 116. These rules mean that a corporation may be incorporated in a high-tax non-U.S. 
country but be “resident” for non-U.S. tax purposes in a low-tax country (a “tax haven”). See 
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 32–33 (2014); Cathy Hwang, 
The New Corporate Migration:  Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 
813–14, 833 (2015). 
 117. In their ideal form, these transactions involve minimal effects on operations and 
ownership. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CORPORATE INVERSION 
TRANSACTIONS:  TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1–2 (2002), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/millstein-center/panel_1_001_office_to_tax_policy.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/KHJ2-Z3RC].  For reasons discussed below, current law generally precludes inversions in 
their ideal form. 
 118. See id. at 29; see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON OUTBOUND 
INVERSION TRANSACTIONS 22 (2002), http://old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/Tax 
LawSection/TaxReports/1014report.pdf (describing post-inversion taxation as on “a de facto 
‘territorial’ basis”) [http://perma.cc/9CQP-NH3Z]. 
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stripping” payments from U.S. entities to non-U.S. entities, aggressive 
intercompany pricing, and careful allocations of the multinational group’s 
interest expense, all of which can shift additional taxable income outside 
the U.S. corporate tax base.119  In practice, however, multinationals can 
attain virtual territoriality through tax planning without undertaking an 
inversion.  This alternative type of self-help territoriality relies on the fact 
that U.S.-incorporated multinationals generally are not taxed on income 
earned by non-U.S. corporate subsidiaries until that income is repatriated to 
the United States as a dividend or similar payment, a concept sometimes 
referred to simply as “deferral.”120  These multinationals either never 
repatriate this non-U.S. income or gain access to the non-U.S. income in 
ways that do not trigger U.S. tax inclusions.  According to Michael Graetz, 
“[I]n the case of corporations, we should probably stop talking as if our 
policy is worldwide taxation of corporate residents and as if any departure 
from such policy, such as taxing active business income of foreign 
corporations only when repatriated, is an aberration.”121  As applied, U.S. 
tax law occupies a space between worldwide and territorial taxation. 
Various provisions in the Code and Treasury regulations attempt to deter 
inversions.122  Among these provisions is section 7874, which qualifies the 
general rules governing corporate residence.123  If a U.S.-incorporated 
multinational undertakes an inversion, and the multinational’s pre-inversion 
shareholders own 80 percent or more of the post-inversion foreign parent 
company, then section 7874 effectively disregards the inversion, and the 
multinational’s post-inversion parent company is treated as a domestic 
corporation for U.S. income tax purposes unless the multinational has 
“substantial business activities” in the relevant foreign jurisdiction.124  
Currently, inversions typically avoid the 80 percent threshold by partnering 
with an existing foreign corporation that is organized in a low-tax 
 
 119. Interest stripping is policed, in part, by I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012), and earnings stripping 
using rents, royalties, or service fees is scrutinized under I.R.C. § 482.  The extent to which 
inversions’ tax benefits stem from these strategies is contested. Compare Michael S. Kirsch, 
The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations:  The Tension Between Symbols 
and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 502–03 
(2005) (very important), with Andrew Velarde, Treasury Sees Tougher Inversion Problems 
than Interest Stripping, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-
notes-today/cross-border-mergers-and-acquisitions/treasury-sees-tougher-inversion-
problems-interest-stripping/2016/02/16/18239596 (less important) [http://perma.cc/K4LG-
DN5N]. 
 120. Subpart F of the Code sets limitations on this type of deferral. See I.R.C. §§ 951–
965. 
 121. Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income:  Inadequate Principles, Outdated 
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 323 (2001). 
 122. See I.R.C. §§ 1248(i), 4985; Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c) (as amended in 2015) (the 
“Helen of Troy” regulations). 
 123. For another anti-inversion provision that addresses corporate residence, see I.R.C. 
§ 269B (treating a foreign corporation and a U.S. corporation whose stock are “stapled”—
unable to be traded independently—as a single U.S. corporation). 
 124. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2), (b).  The threshold for “substantial business activities” is 
relatively high. See I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775 (stating Treasury’s intent to 
issue regulations tightening the “substantial business activities” exception). 
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jurisdiction such as Ireland or Switzerland.125  This type of “inversion 
‘lite’” mimics an economically motivated “real” acquisition.126 
Fundamentally, the policy question raised by inversions involves the 
scope of the U.S. corporate tax base.  The law must distinguish domestic 
entities subject to U.S. corporate taxation on their worldwide income from 
foreign entities that do not face this regime.127  The decision about where to 
incorporate, the touchstone of the U.S. corporate residence rules under the 
Code, is relatively (and increasingly) elastic, at least for some taxpayers.128  
For example, multinationals may be able to draw on contract law, 
innovations in local corporate law, or increasingly complete financial 
markets to “replicate the benefits of Delaware incorporation without 
actually selecting it.”129  This flexibility indicates that, from an efficiency 
perspective, inversions present a line-drawing problem for which 
policymakers should group close substitutes, assuming the unavailability of 
fundamental reform.130 
Identifying the relevant close substitutes, however, is challenging 
because inversions implicate multiple axes of comparison.  Incorporation 
outside the United States may be a close substitute for U.S. 
incorporation,131 self-help territoriality through deferral may be a close 
substitute for self-help territoriality through inversions,132 and “real” cross-
border acquisitions may be close substitutes for inversions.133  Furthermore, 
the availability of these substitutes may vary across industries or sectors in 
 
 125. See Hwang, supra note 116, at 831–37; see also I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-52 
I.R.B. 712, § 2 (stating Treasury’s intent to issue regulations addressing transactions to tailor 
companies’ size to avoid I.R.C. § 7874). 
 126. See generally Lewis J. Greenwald & David H. Kaplan, Inversions “Lite”:  Finding 
“Substantial Business Activity” Under the New U.S. Regs, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 515 (2006); 
Lee A. Sheppard, Challenging Unwritten Inversion Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 
17, 2016), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/cross-border-mergers-and-acquisitions/ 
news-analysis-challenging-unwritten-inversion-regulations/2016/02/17/18242816 
(describing I.R.C. § 7874 as “a weak statute”) [http://perma.cc/ZJ3J-LRWX]. 
 127. Entities incorporated outside the United States remain subject to tax, including a 
substitute entity-level tax (the “branch profits tax”), on income that arises in, or is effectively 
connected to, the United States.  For the relevant Code provisions, see I.R.C. §§ 881, 882, 
884; tax treaties follow a similar framework. 
 128. See Eric J. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory 
Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2015) (“America’s traditional market power in 
regulatory competition has begun to slip.”); see also SHAVIRO, supra note 116, at 67–70 
(elaborating on factors that influence the elasticity of tax residence). 
 129. SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 143; see also Kane & Rock, supra note 8, at 1265–69 
(arguing that, although U.S. corporations “los[t] some value simply because they became 
subject to a different regime of [non-U.S.] corporate law,” this loss was mitigated by the 
quasi-regulatory listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange). 
 130. In addition to grouping close substitutes, policymakers generally should disfavor 
corporate taxation. See supra Part I. 
 131. For discussions of various differences in U.S. and non-U.S. corporate law, see 
Hwang, supra note 116, at 838–42; Talley, supra note 128, at 1690–700. 
 132. Inversions and deferral probably are not perfect substitutes because inversions may 
facilitate more earnings stripping than deferral. 
 133. These types of combinations, however, may have costs. See Hwang, supra note 116, 
at 844–45. 
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the economy, complicating an efficiency analysis.134  Although each of 
these three axes likely favors a rule less stringent than current law, the 
precise contours of a rule that maximizes efficiency across all three axes 
depends on how these axes interact in producing overall efficiency, as well 
as the relative normative weights given to each axis.135  The answer to the 
former question may be difficult or impossible for policymakers to 
determine, and the answer to the latter question may fall outside of 
particular policymakers’ expertise.136 
Nontax legal regimes and social understandings about inversions may 
illuminate these policy decisions in a different way.  Implicit in efficiency-
oriented reforms such as the check-the-box regulations is that policymakers 
should separately consider tax policy and corporate law, but doing so may 
have deleterious systemic effects.  For example, Eric Talley argues that 
“severing the link completely” between corporate and tax law may cause 
“the variety and quality of corporate governance regimes worldwide [to] 
atrophy.”137  In addition, to the extent that U.S. public policy is intertwined 
with the success and failure of companies with substantial ties to the United 
States, inversions may result in nontax harms.138 
Finally, the public and political rhetoric surrounding inversions means 
that these transactions—and their policing—have significant social 
meaning.  For example, in response to the proposed inversion of Stanley 
Works in 2002, Senator Chuck Grassley, at the time the ranking Republican 
on the Senate Finance Committee, said:  “These expatriations aren’t illegal.  
But they’re sure immoral.  During a war on terrorism, coming out of a 
recession, everyone ought to be pulling together.  If companies don’t have 
their hearts in America, they ought to get out.”139  Stanley Works’s 
shareholders approved the reincorporation shortly after Grassley’s 
comments, but the company’s board “threw out the results the next day” in 
response to public and governmental pressure.140  These social 
understandings not only influence multinationals’ behavior and the 
 
 134. See id. at 846–48, 850–51. 
 135. For example, if multiple lines lead to identical efficiency results, policymakers 
should consider other normative factors in setting policy. But see Weisbach, supra note 4, at 
1675–76 (arguing that local improvements in efficiency should control where policymakers’ 
ability to draw lines is constrained). 
 136. See supra Part I. 
 137. See Talley, supra note 128, at 1653–54. 
 138. See Hwang, supra note 116, at 842–44. 
 139. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Grassley Announces Bill to Rein in Corporate 
Expatriation (Apr. 11, 2002), http://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-news/ 
grassley-announces-bill-to-rein-in-corporate-expatriation [http://perma.cc/XN5D-82SR]. 
 140. See David Cay Johnston, Stanley Works Backs Away from a Move to Avoid Taxes, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/02/business/stanley-works-
backs-away-from-a-move-to-avoid-taxes.html [http://perma.cc/KX5G-VSYM].  On the day 
after the shareholder vote, two state officials sued Stanley Works, and investigators from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission contacted the company.  Union leaders also accused 
Stanley Works’s CEO of “stealing the election”—that is, the shareholder referendum.  In 
August 2002, Stanley Works abandoned its inversion attempt entirely. Id. 
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elasticity of corporate residence, but they also indicate ways in which tax 
policy can be aligned with democratic or popular sentiment.141 
CONCLUSION 
In addressing which entities should face the corporate tax, commentators 
generally have looked to efficiency considerations as the principal metric by 
which to gauge the success or failure of the law.  This is particularly true 
with respect to the check-the-box regulations.  This turn to efficiency, 
however, downplays the fact that corporate taxation—a structural feature of 
the Code—intersects with other, nontax legal regimes, as well as social 
understandings about corporations’ personhood, rights, and responsibilities.  
For this reason, this Article contends that the appropriate line between 
corporate and conduit entities for tax purposes depends not only on whether 
such distinctions are efficient but also on the valence of each category in 
nontax legal and social contexts.  More generally, even structural aspects of 
the Code must be understood within larger legal and social contexts, and the 
precise ways in which these legal and social contexts implicate the 
boundaries of corporate taxation warrant further exploration. 
This contention has two broader implications.  First, non-tax legal and 
social understandings are interwoven with the tax system, and this fact 
provides a possible answer for why policymakers, including Congress, 
rarely implement tax reforms that advance efficiency by eliminating line-
drawing problems.142  For example, among tax scholars, a substantial 
consensus opposes “meaningless distinctions” such as classical corporate 
taxation, which requires delineation of corporate and conduit entities for tax 
purposes, and the debt/equity distinction, which entails the differentiation of 
equity investors from lenders to a business.143  Such lines may be 
inconvenient from a tax perspective but critically important from a nontax 
legal perspective; alternatively, the social meaning of these distinctions may 
be important.144 
In addition, the heterogeneity of nontax legal and social understandings 
suggests that the strict binary choices characteristic of line-drawing 
questions may be incomplete.  Indeed, while the check-the-box regulations 
typically address a choice between corporate (subchapter C) and partnership 
(subchapter K) tax treatment, a fuller picture of the corporate tax base 
includes conduits such as S corporations (subchapter S) and REITs 
(subchapter M), as well as nonprofits and foreign corporations not subject 
 
 141. For a discussion of the potential value of such sentiment, see supra Part II.C. 
 142. See supra note 12. 
 143. Many of these “meaningless distinctions” are best characterized as structural. See 
Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1637–43; see also SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 48–52 (discussing 
“pillars of sand”); Schlunk, supra note 10, at 861 (“[T]he most robust approach is simply to 
eliminate the inconsistent tax treatment of the existing items.”). 
 144. For example, the social implications of debt may differ from those of equity, and 
these social implications may change over time. See generally BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC 
OF DEBTORS:  BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002). 
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to U.S. tax at the entity level.145  Each of these regimes operates according 
to different rules and with varying effects.  Taken together, these regimes 
imply that future policy choices involving entity classification for tax 
purposes need not reside within the narrow constraints of the current check-
the-box rules.146 
 
 145. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006); see also supra Part III. 
 146. For a similar rejection of all-or-nothing approaches in the international tax context, 
see SHAVIRO, supra note 116, at 187–90. 
